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0011: Bounded offline bundles and reported claim states

Date: 2026-10-20. Status: implemented software contract, pending owner protocol adoption and independent review. Implements W07 / #8. No prior experiment or research identity is migrated, and no prior result becomes v1 evidence.

Decision

hallmark.bundles implements EmbeddedFile, Bundle, ResponseEnvelope, BundleStatus, Claim and VerificationResult. The top-level schema IDs are hallmark/bundle/1, hallmark/response-envelope/1, hallmark/bundle-status/1 and hallmark/verification-result/1. EmbeddedFile and Claim are nested records without schema IDs, like FileRef and RegistryEntry. Existing nested receipt, proof, epoch, registry and opening IDs remain mandatory.

Every object is frozen and strict, rejects unknown/missing fields and revalidates before encoding. Nullable fields are required and explicitly null, never omitted. Canonical binary decode_bundle(raw, limits=external_limits) is the untrusted bundle-input boundary. JSON schemas are hex-byte projections; general Pydantic Python/JSON constructors are not bounded stream readers.

Bundle contents and resource bounds

Bundle has exactly its declared receipt, epoch, registry, history, three proof records and 1–8,192 embedded files. History has 0–1,024 intermediate snapshots, using W08's definition. A bundle cannot replace the caller's trust, expectation, checkpoint or clock. It has no binding-mode selector; mode comes from external trust. Parsing does not verify registry signatures or chain continuity.

Each embedded file must match its FileRef byte length and raw SHA-256. Paths are normalized logical names, sorted and unique. Traversal, absolute paths, backslashes, control characters and URL-like locators are rejected by the shared FileRef contract. Names are case-sensitive and not normalized further. Identical bytes may have distinct logical names; duplicate names are invalid even if their content matches. No path is opened, extracted, linked or fetched.

Every epoch collateral reference must resolve to an exactly matching embedded reference. Receipt epoch/model/key declarations must match the supplied epoch. The three ordered proof public-input records must equal the three receipt inputs; missing, extra, duplicate or reordered proofs fail. This is declared consistency. Full artifact closure, manifest/backend/key/setup resolution, actual proof validity and atomic publication remain the assembler/verifier's responsibilities.

The entire encoded value, including all headers, metadata, history and payloads, must fit 64 MiB, nesting 16 and the codec's 1,048,576-item ceiling. Each proof is at most 16 MiB. The bundle validator reuses the codec's value-tree measurement before serializing a second full buffer. Caller limits can only lower these caps. decode_bundle checks binary size/depth before model validation and applies the caller proof cap to each proof. bundle.validate_limits(limits) performs the same checks on an existing object. Worker time/RSS enforcement remains a separate verifier responsibility; these methods do not start workers or accept evidence.

Opening exchange and response lifecycle

Neither B1 nor B2 puts an opening field in a bundle. Canonical embedded wire records declaring hallmark/transcript-opening/1 or hallmark/response-envelope/1 are also rejected, so a normal serialized private record cannot be accidentally attached as a file. This is a protocol-record check, not a general detector of secrets in arbitrary opaque or differently encoded bytes. The assembler must admit only the required artifact inventory; raw transcripts and witnesses are never bundle files.

B1 exchanges the opening separately through an explicitly authorized confidential channel. A ResponseEnvelope belongs to that response channel and may contain an opening. Its repr hides response/opening values, but serialization discloses them. A present opening must match both the response bytes and receipt commitment. Responses use exact UTF-8, at most 32,768 bytes, with no normalization.

Reported response status Receipt release Response / opening
pending, ready released response required, possibly empty; opening optional
blocked blocked both null
failed, expired released both null

Failed/expired proof collection does not retroactively change a previously signed release. These terminal envelopes omit private payloads. This record check does not perform retention, deletion, durable release or recovery.

BundleStatus is separate collection metadata. Only ready carries a nonempty bundle FileRef and no error. pending carries neither reference nor error; blocked carries POLICY_BLOCKED; expired carries STALE_EVIDENCE; failed carries a finite failure code other than PROOF_PENDING/POLICY_BLOCKED. All nonready states have a null bundle reference. A ready reference alone does not authenticate the file or prove that a worker verified it.

Reported results are not verification

VerificationResult can represent reported B1 A+B, B1 B-only and B2 A+B outcomes, as well as rejection, declined/unavailable claims, pending proofs and policy block. It exposes no verifier or factory that converts a parsed bundle to accepted evidence. The golden accepted-result examples are explicitly synthetic declarations. Decoding a provider-supplied result never grants trust in its accepted field.

Accepted A uses hardware-attested strength; accepted B uses cryptographic strength. Rejected/not-accepted claims have strength none. Every claim retains policy-errors, adaptive-evasion and unobserved-traffic; A also retains hardware-trust. B2 B retains hardware-input-binding and cannot be accepted without accepted A. Accepted B requires proof-soundness, circuit-correctness and registry-trust assumptions. B1 B rejects the two hardware-trust identifiers.

Assumptions/residuals, error codes and evidence hashes are sorted and unique, within their schema counts. Error fields use the existing finite ErrorCode vocabulary, not arbitrary messages. There is no safe field.

An overall accepted report requires accepted B, policy pass, no rejection of A, no error codes and nonempty evidence references. B1 may decline A for B-only requirements. validate_requirements(external_trust) checks the reported mode and whether an accepted report satisfies the caller's required A; it does not authenticate the report, its referenced evidence or the trust policy's provenance.

A policy verdict requires accepted B. A false verdict and POLICY_BLOCKED must occur together; this distinguishes a reported genuine policy block from a native collection status whose proof has not been checked. PROOF_PENDING requires B not-accepted, not rejected. PROOF_INVALID requires rejected B and ATTESTATION_INVALID requires rejected A. Any nonaccepted overall result needs at least one reason code. These consistency rules do not implement the verifier's ordered execution stages or independent evaluation.

Four schema snapshots and 17 structural/report examples are shipped in docs/schemas/ and fixtures/wire/bundles-v1.json. The receipt signatures, hardware quotes and proof payloads in those examples remain unverified.