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0007: all-pass policy and explicit request expectations

Date: 2026-10-20. Implements W05 / issue #6 under the autonomous backlog request. This is contract implementation, not policy adoption, enrollment or deployment. No historical experiment or result is reused under this v1 interpretation.

Policy declaration and resolution

hallmark.policy.Policy is a frozen artifact with schema_id="hallmark/policy/1" and identity H("policy", complete_record). It requires the rubric digest, exactly three distinct classifier identities in rule/MLP/encoder order, combination all-pass, language en, scope prompt, and prompt/response byte limits in 0..32768. A zero limit admits only empty content; it does not disable the limit. Every field is included in the identity.

Digest bytes do not reveal classifier kinds. policy.validate_classifiers therefore requires an explicit three-element tuple of classifier manifests, revalidates them and checks both their kinds and identities in order. Reordering the digests together with the supplied manifests still fails. Duplicate kinds with distinct identities also fail. This check performs no file access and does not qualify classifier programs or execute all-pass over proof results.

The named policy inj.direct/1 remains a proposal for an English single-turn prompt-injection assay. The name, this schema and synthetic fixtures do not admit a rubric, data, classifier, use case or relying party. W13 and POLICY-DATA in RFC-0004 still require owner/relying-party admission.

Requests and caller expectations

RequestExpectation is independently decodable and has the required schema_id="hallmark/request-expectation/1" both by itself and when nested in a request or later receipt. It pins the ASCII audience ID, 32-byte nonce, 32-byte interaction ID, model and policy digests, and an explicitly nullable continuity expectation. No field defaults to something chosen by the sender.

ChainExpectation is a nested record with no schema ID. It requires a strict U64 sequence and explicitly nullable predecessor digest. Sequence zero requires null; all later sequences require a 32-byte digest. Null continuity makes no history claim and differs from explicitly expecting sequence zero.

Request has schema_id="hallmark/request/1" and requires the complete expectation, prompt and system-reference digest. Prompt text is exact UTF-8, with no trimming or normalization and a hard cap of 32768 bytes, including multibyte characters. Empty strings are valid. Prompt text is omitted from object repr, but encoding and JSON export still contain it and must use an authorized private channel.

request.validate_against(expected, model=..., policy=..., classifiers=...) requires a separate caller expectation. After schema revalidation and classifier resolution, it compares every expectation field, checks the actual model/policy identities and applies the policy's prompt byte cap. Mismatches use REQUEST_MISMATCH at bind; policy byte-limit failures use LIMIT_EXCEEDED at bind. Malformed schemas and classifier sets use the existing sanitized INPUT_INVALID parsing boundary.

The caller must construct expectations independently; using request.expected as its own trust source defeats this comparison. The supplied artifacts still need externally authenticated enrollment. No nonce is generated, consumed or deduplicated here, and byte validation cannot prove CSPRNG use or freshness. The requester must generate nonces securely; the later authenticated gateway must enforce one-time admission. Prompt/system-reference transcript binding is W02. Enforcing the response byte limit on generated content is a later serving obligation. This API does not verify receipts, continuity history or evidence.

Wire and snapshots

All fields are required, including nullable ones. Frozen nested records are revalidated at encoding and comparison boundaries. Only policy has its own typed identity here; requests/expectations do not invent new hash domains. W02 includes the full expectation record in the specified context hash.

JSON schema projections use hex for bytes: policy, expectation, and request. They cannot express all cross-field constraints or UTF-8 byte lengths. Untrusted inputs use the canonical CBOR decoders and explicit resolution/comparison methods; direct Pydantic error objects are not log-safe diagnostics.

The fixed vector contains a harmless prompt, synthetic unadmitted declarations and fixed public nonce/interaction bytes. It tests encoding and contract checks only, not policy quality or security of a deployed system.